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POLICY CHALLENGE
Both the European Union and the United States must adapt to the scientific
surge from China and other emerging nations. In the US, decision makers
fear that their open model for building scientific power, based to a great
extent on recruiting talent from abroad, has passed its peak. But for the
moment the US-China connection is still strong, growing, virtuous and
mutually beneficial. In fact, the emerging multipolar science world looks set
to be dominated by a US-China
G2. With its more inward-looking
perspective, the EU needs to do
more than focus on internal
integration. The European
Research Area programme pro-
vides the framework for a
European policy agenda, but
this should place much greater
and more urgent emphasis on
building excellence and open-
ness to researchers and their














Trends in China’s share of world
scientific publications (%)
THE ISSUEScience is becoming increasingly globalised. The emerging eco-
nomic powerhouses, particularly China, are building up their own scientific
capabilities rapidly and in a targeted way. This is provoking concern within
advanced economies that they might be losing their advantage in the
scientific domains that can be part of the foundation for new areas of
growth. Strategies for knowledge-based growth, such as the European
Union's 2020 strategy, must take these global trends into account if they
are to deliver long-term international competitiveness.
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journals carry an Eng-
lish-language bias as
well as a disciplinary
bias in favour of bio-
medicine and life
sciences. For a similar
analysis of world
scientific publications,
using the Scopus data-
base, see Royal Society
(2011).
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH used to be
predominantly a developed-world
activity, with the United States at
the forefront and the European
Union close behind. But a more
multipolar scientific world is in
the making, in which several
emerging nations will participate
prominently. The most striking
case is China, which is going
through a uniquely rapid rise. In
fact, the future multipolar
scientific world looks set to be
dominated by a G2 – China and
the US – which will build on self-
reinforcing links.
The EU needs to adapt if it is to
keep pace. At present, it is mostly
focused on creating an integrated
internal market. Its international
collaborations are marked by pro-
nounced EU-supported, intra-EU
collaboration, diverting attention
from the US and emerging Asia as
scientific collaboration partners.
The EU is also less active than the
US as a source and destination on
the world market for scientific
talent.
By contrast, the US science model
has traditionally been very open.
Because the US science and engi-
neering workforce is highly
dependent on foreigners, espe-
cially from Asia, the rise of Asia
provokes deep concern about the
sustainability of the American
capacity for innovation and inter-
national competitiveness.
However, there are no signs so far
that the open US model has
become less attractive to foreign
talent. On the contrary, the US
continues to attract and retain
increasing numbers of talented
Chinese scientists.
The changing face of the scientific
world shows how many emerging
country governments have come
to view science and technology
as integral to economic growth,
and have consequently taken
steps to develop their  science
and technology infrastructures. In
its twelfth five-year plan (2011-
15)
1 China lists the promotion of
scientific and technological
progress and innovation as a
major tool for supporting strategic
economic restructuring, and aims
to be the world's scientific leader
by 2050. Consistent with the
build up of its high-tech industrial
competitiveness, China is becom-
ing particularly strong in
engineering, chemistry and
physics.
In this Policy Brief we first look at
the shifts in global science,
asking if new scientific power-
houses have emerged. The
answer is clearly that they have,
with China the most impressive
case. We then study the impact of
these shifts on the international
mobility of scientific talent and
the patterns of international
scientific collaboration. Most of
this analysis focuses on the rela-
tionship between the US and
China. That the EU is not promi-
nent in the analysis reflects its
position on the sidelines. With its
more inward-looking model, will
the EU be able to respond to the
globalisation of science? We con-
clude with a discussion on the
policy implications for the EU if it
wants a seat at the new global
science table.
THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF
SCIENCE
The US and the EU have for
decades led the world in produc-
tion of scientific knowledge in
both quantity and quality terms
2.
However, in quantity terms, both
the US and the EU, and other
developed nations  have started
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Source: Bruegel based on NSF, Science and Engineering Indicators 2010. Note: Asia-8: India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Asia-10: Asia-8
plus China and Japan. Counts for 2008 are incomplete.



















quality distribution, more than
half of cited articles continue to
originate from the US. This posi-
tion is only slightly eroding, with
the EU catching up in the top
segment (whereas in quantity
terms it has outperformed the US
since 1994).
China and other Asian countries
are for now only very modestly
making inroads into the top
segment. However, in specific
fields, engineering being the
prime example, the top segment
is also contested. China and other
Asian countries are already
having a significant impact on
this discipline, and the gap
between China/Asia and the
EU/US is closing fast.
THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF
R&D EXPENDITURES AND
WORKFORCES
The rise in the scientific output of
Asia, particularly China, corre-
lates with substantial investment
by these countries in building up
their scientific and technological
capacities (Figure 2, panel A, on
the next page). South Korean R&D
spending has increased steeply,
and China’s R&D/GDP ratio has
more than doubled, from 0.6 per-
cent in 1996 to 1.5 percent in
2007, a period during which
China’s GDP grew at 12 percent
annually – an enormous, sus-
tained increase. China plans a 2.2
percent R&D/GDP ratio for 2011-
15. By comparison, although it
has a three percent research
spending target, the EU continues
to hover below two percent.
(three to 15 percent), and
physics (four to 13 percent).
India and South Korea are also
notable for increasing volumes of
engineering articles. However, in
life sciences China is still weak.
For the moment, the EU and the
US are holding on to their predom-
inant role in this area (Table 1).
Quality of research is another
matter of course. In terms of
research impact, measured by
the number of times scientific
publications are cited, the US's
dominant position is less con-
tested (Table 2). At the top of the
Table 1: Share of region in world publications, by field (%, 2007)
US EU China Japan Asia-8
All fields 28 32 8 7 7
Engineering 20 28 13 8 15
Chemistry 16 31 15 9 11
Physics 18 31 13 10 10
Life sciences 34 34 4 7 5
Table 2: Trends in publications shares across the quality distribution (%)
All fields Share of all articles Share of Top1 articles Share of Bottom50
articles
1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008
US 34 29 62 52 30 25
EU 35 33 25 30 34 33
Japan 8.5 7.8 4.3 4.5 9 8.5
China 1.6 5.9 0.1 2.5 2 6.7
Asia-8 3.6 6.8 0.3 2.2 4.5 7.9
Engineer-
ing
Share of all articles Share of Top1 articles Share of Bottom50
articles
1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008
US 30 21 49 38 28 19
EU 30 29 29 25 29 27
Japan 12 10 9 6 12 11.5
China 3.1 10.4 1.3 10.6 3.4 10.6
Asia-8 7.9 14.1 2.2 10.6 8.5 14.9
Source for both tables: Bruegel based on NSF, Science and Engineering Indicators 2010. Note:
Top1: 99th percentile of citations received; Bottom50: publications with 0 or 1 citations; 1998 are
all 1994-96 articles cited by 1998 articles; 2008 are all 2004-06 articles cited by 2008 articles.
China. China has doubled its
output since 2004 and now pub-
lishes more than any other
country apart from the US (Figure
1). Publication frequency has
also risen in other emerging
nations such as Brazil, South
Korea and Turkey. By contrast, the
quantitative performances of
India and Russia have stagnated
or declined.
China's research priorities are
shown by a big jump in its share
of world publications in engineer-
ing (from three percent in 1995 to
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Estimates of the number of
scientific researchers provide
broad support for the trends and
shifts suggested by the R&D data
(Figure 2, panel B, on the next
page). China has more than dou-
bled its research workforce,
boosting its world share from 13
percent to 25 percent between
1995-2007. It now has as many
researchers in its workforce as the
EU and US: about 1.4 million.
And there are many more Chinese
researchers to come, as indicated
by bachelor, master and PhD
degree award trends. This holds
particularly for natural sciences
and engineering. While western
governments are concerned
about lagging student interest in
these areas, which are consid-
ered vital for knowledge-intensive
economies, the number of first
university degrees awarded in
these fields in China has risen
spectacularly from about
239,000 in 1998 to 807,000 in
2006. The trend is also seen in
the award of PhD degrees in
China, where natural sciences
and engineering doctorates
increased more than tenfold up to
2006, close to the number
awarded in the US (about
21,000). In the EU there has been
little increase in the number of
doctorates. It is also worth noting
that, in the US, 31 percent of doc-
torates are awarded to students
from China, 14 percent to stu-
dents from India, and seven
percent to students from South
Korea.
The Chinese programme of build-
ing indigenous scientific capacity
concentrates on the top end. Of
the 1700 Chinese chartered insti-
tutes of higher education, six
percent are so-called 'Project 211'
national key universities and col-
leges. These receive 70 percent of
scientific research funding, and
award degrees to about a third of
all Chinese undergraduate stu-
dents, two-thirds of graduate
students and four-fifths of doc-
toral students. Within the Project































Source: Bruegel based on NSF, Science and Engineering Indicators 2010. Note: US data for 2007 estimated based on 2004–06 growth rate.
Figure 2: A (left panel) R&D expenditures as % of GDP;
B (right panel) Number of researchers by geographic area (000s, full-time equivalent)
Universities are on the way to
being among the world's elite uni-
versities. Both are already listed
among the top 200 in the Shang-






What will the impact of the rise of
the Asian scientific powerhouses
be on science in advanced
economies? In particular, does a
shift of scientific power to Asia
mean that the flows of scientific
talent from east to west will dry
up, crippling the advanced
economies’ scientific machines?
US universities import much of
their scientific talent from abroad,
particularly from Asia, and are
therefore particularly worried
about continuing to be able to fill
their laboratories with imported
brains. This concern, however, is
not so far justified by the data. On


















4. The pattern of foreign
PhDs in the EU is com-
pletely different to the
US. First, there are fewer
foreign PhDs in the EU:
Other-EU nationals rep-





Africa and Latin Amer-
ica. Major destination
countries are the UK
(for Asia), France (for
Africa) and Spain (for
Latin America). Source:
Mougeroux (2006).









come back to work in
China.
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any other institutions, with native
Berkeley only coming in third
place (Stephan, 2011).
The presence of foreign PhD stu-
dents in the EU is less well
systematically recorded. The
imperfect evidence shows that
the PhD student populations of EU
countries have fewer foreigners
compared to the US, and the ori-
gins of foreign PhD students are
different, with a less strong Asian
presence and geographic, cultural










ing their students to the best
training ground in the world – the
US – in order to bring them back
home with state-of-the-art
scientific knowledge. The data,
however, do not show high return
rates for foreign students who
have obtained a PhD in the US, at
least in the period immediately
after PhD graduation. Stay rates
for Asian PhDs in the US in partic-
ular are significantly higher than
the rates for other foreigners (see
Black and Stephan, 2007). And as
Table 3 shows these high Chinese
and Indian PhD stay rates have
not diminished during the time
period.
Many foreign PhD students move
after their PhD studies to take up
post-doctoral positions in other
US research institutes, which
recruit post-docs both from US
and non-US graduate schools.
Post-doc positions are thus
another entry point to the US for
foreign talent. The share of tempo-
rary residents among post-docs
at US universities stood at 57 per-
cent in 2006 (NSF, 2010) up from
51 percent in 1993. Asians are
also taking more academic posi-
tions in US institutes. In 2006,
about 17 percent of academic
positions were held by Asians
(with US citizenship or foreign
born), up from eight percent in
1981 (NSF, 2010).
There is evidence that foreigners
in US academic institutes, having
gone through a tougher selection
process, contribute dispropor-
tionally to top science. Foreigners
in the US are twice as likely than
natives to be the first author on
frequently cited 'hot papers', or to
be among the most-cited authors
(Stephan and Levin, 2007). A vir-
tuous circle thus seems to
emerge: the US's top position in
science is based on its openness
to the best foreign talents, who
stay long enough to make a con-
tribution to quality science, and
this top position continues to
Table 3: Non-US recipients of US
PhDs by home country (%, all fields)
Share of total Plan to stay
96-99 04-07 96-99 04-07
China 26 31 93 91
India 12 12 90 89
S. Korea 9 10 50 69
Europe 14 14 71 75
Source: NSF, Science and Engineering Indica-
tors 2010.
that the international mobility of
scientific talent is increasing.
While in 2000, 1.9 million foreign
students were enrolled in tertiary
education outside their country of
origin, the figure was more than
three million in 2007  (OECD,
2009). The most significant
country of origin of these stu-
dents was, not surprisingly, China
(15 percent of all foreign enrolled
tertiary students), followed by
India (5.4 percent). The favoured
destinations for these students
were the US (20 percent), fol-
lowed by the UK (20 percent),
Germany (8.5 percent) and
France (8.2 percent). The China-
US flow is thus the most
important international educa-
tional connection, closely
followed by the India-US flow. The
China-US flow has not reduced,
notwithstanding China’s increas-
ing indigenous scientific capacity.
On the contrary, the number of
Chinese students
heading to the US
increased at an aver-




When focusing on PhD students
among tertiary students, the
China-US link  is even more pro-
nounced. China’s share of PhD
degrees awarded by US institu-
tions to foreigners continues to
grow, being almost one third of all
'foreign' PhDs in the US in 2007
(Table 3). Tsinghua and Beijing
Universities provide more stu-





to top science.’attract the best foreign talent. The
EU has not managed to establish
such a virtuous open model.
What if the rise of indigenous
scientific and technological
capacity in Asia/China should
eventually persuade their foreign-
educated scientists to return
home? As Table 3 shows, this
does not yet seem to be happen-
ing, at least not immediately after
graduation. But Asian scientists
could be returning home at  later
stages in their careers. There is no
doubt that China is aggressively
seeking to bring home talented
individuals
5. But hard data sup-
porting the importance of these
return flows is still lacking. In any
case, return flows at later career
stages still leaves plenty of scope
for the host country to benefit
from imported foreign talent.
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION
IN SCIENCE
Is China also becoming a new
partner for scientific cooperation
with the west? The data does not
show major shifts in collaboration
patterns (Table 4). The emerging
scientific powerhouses, particu-
larly China, are still relatively
under-represented as partners for
the west. China’s collaboration is
mostly with other Asian
economies. Its collaboration with
the US has increased over time on
par with the growth of its own
scientific power. The intense flow
of PhDs between the US and China
undoubtedly contributes to
smoother US-China collaboration.



















6. There is also evidence
that foreigners are
increasingly responsible
for US patents. Freeman
(2005) reports that one
quarter of US patent
applications filed at the
World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organisation in
2006 were authored by
a non-US national, up
from seven percent in
1998. Of US technology
and engineering start-
ups, about one quarter
have an immigrant as a
key founder. For Silicon
Valley start-ups, this
may be even more than
half (Demos, 2008).
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on this flow of talent, benefit less.
The EU’s collaboration with China
remains at a far lower level that it
could be, considering the growth
of China’s scientific power.
By contrast, intra-EU collabora-
tion has substantially increased
over time, suggesting progress
has been made in building the
integrated European Research




PhDs are also widespread in the
US private sector research work-
force. Foreigners made up 25
percent of tertiary-educated
workers in science and engineer-
ing occupations in the US in 2003.
For holders of doctorates, the
figure was 40 percent (NSF,
2010). About half of the foreign-
born scientists and engineers in
the US are from Asia (16 percent
from India, 11 percent from China,
4-6 percent each from the Philip-
pines, South Korea, and Taiwan).
The Chinese share increases to
22 percent for those with a PhD. 
Foreign talent is thus vital for US
science and engineering
6. This
explains why the US fears that its
science machine will start to
splutter if the pool of mobile for-
eign talent entering the US dries
up. There is no clear evidence so
far to justify this fear. For the
moment, the increase in Asia’s
own capacity to produce science
Source: Bruegel based on NSF, Science and Engineering Indicators 2010. Note: an index of inter-
national collaboration corrects for the effects of the unequal size of countries’ research
establishments. Values above ‘1’ indicate greater-than-expected rates of collaboration.
 Table 4: Collaboration trends; International Collaboration Index for selected
country pairs (1998-2008)
With US 1998 2008 With China 1998 2008
US-UK 0.67 0.74 CN-UK 0.58 0.52
US-GER 0.68 0.68 CN-GER 0.6 0.44
US-FRA 0.56 0.6 CN-FRA 0.39 0.38
US-JAP 1.03 0.89 CN-JAP 1.53 1.38
US-CN 0.82 0.97 CN-US 0.82 0.97
US-SKOR 1.38 1.23 CN-SKOR 1.72 1.17
US-INDIA 0.92 0.79 CN-INDIA 0.98 0.64
Intra-EU 1998 2008 Intra-EU 1998 2008
UK-GER 0.68 0.86 NL-BEL 2.5 2.68
UK-FRA 0.73 0.87 NL-GER 0.95 1.29
UK-IT 0.86 1.04 GER-PL 1.15 1.34
UK-NL 1.05 1.27 GER-CZ 1.27 1.46
FRA-GER 0.74 0.91 PL-CZ 2.15 3.48
FRA-IT 1.12 1.34 SE-FIN 3.39 3.98
ES-IT 1.38 1.63 SE-DK 2.88 3.38
ES-PT 2.55 2.9 FIN-DK 2.36 3.15and engineering degrees does not
seem to have disconnected the
US from the pool of potential
Asian scientists. In fact, the con-
trary seems to be the case. 
On the back of an increase in its
indigenous scientific and techno-
logical capacity, Asia has become
an increasingly attractive loca-
tion for multinational companies'
research activities. In an UNCTAD
survey of the world's biggest cor-
porate R&D spenders, China
(third) and India (sixth) were
already among the top-ranked
countries for corporate R&D. As
future target locations, China was
ranked first and India third
(UNCTAD, 2005).
When asked why they are moving
their R&D labs east, western firms
report not only lower labour costs
and the importance of the growth








The increase in Asia’s
indigenous scientific
capacity is therefore increasingly
becoming a factor in the attrac-
tiveness of Asia for western
corporate R&D labs.
EU POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Emerging economies have
grasped that scientific power is
based on ambition and massive
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education. Their governments
have firmly built investment in
higher education and science into
their development policies as
they vie to build competitiveness
in technology-intensive sectors.
The result has been a continued
increase in the scientific power of
these countries.
The benefits from a more global
science world will







brains. The US's dominant posi-
tion in science is based on its
openness to the brightest talents
of all nationalities. Its top position
continues to attract the best tal-
ents of all nationalities, who





rates and high stay
rates for Asian scien-
tists, this open
model, at least for the
moment, continues
to bear fruit for the US, even if its
most important source country,
China, is rapidly developing its
own scientific capability and
wants to bring its foreign-based
scholars home.
China’s scientific growth model,
aspiring to be indigenous,
involves sending out its increas-
ingly better locally-trained
scholars to the best institutes in
the world, and reaping the bene-
fits when they return, typically at
later stages in their careers when
they have fully developed their
capabilities, leaving enough of a
window of opportunity for the
host country to likewise benefit
from them. This favours the con-





scape will look more
like a G2 than a truly
multipolar global
system.
The evidence in this Policy Brief
shows that the globalisation of
science is primarily a story about
the relationship between China
and the US. The EU, to a great
extent, remains on the sideline. In
this context, the EU has some
serious thinking to do about its
place in the future global science
landscape. For now it is largely
holding its own, based on the
intensifying process of intra-EU
integration, the making of a Euro-
pean Research Area (ERA).
However, it does not have the
same deep openness to foreign
scientific talent as the US, imply-
ing that steps must be taken if the
EU is to ride the waves of
scientific globalisation.
As a starter, the EU must show
more commitment to joining the
science globalisation train, and to
subsequently ensuring that Euro-
pean economies will benefit.
European science and technology
‘The EU, to a great
extent, remains on
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policymakers should therefore
promote scientific collaboration
outside the EU, should do more to
attract and retain the best foreign
talent, and should stimulate the
EU's talents to go to the best uni-
versities and institutes, wherever
they are in the world. Connections
with these outflows must be
maintained, and incentives must
be provided to encourage schol-
ars to return home, at optimal
stages in their careers. 
A large scientific area charac-
terised by scientific excellence is
a necessary condition for this
policy agenda. Excellence will
ensure that talented people in
European research institutes and
firms will be better able to absorb
but should be a lever for global
integration.
The globalisation of science will
undoubtedly bring unprecedented
scientific and economic benefits
to the world. But it will also pro-
voke concerns about increased
competition. Only the best will be
able to master this game of com-
petition and cooperation. 
When Freeman (2005) asked a
top Harvard physicist, who had
published important work in coop-
eration with Asian scientists, "so,
you are helping them catch up
with us?" the scientist replied,
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the new knowledge generated
abroad, and that European
research institutes and firms will
be more attractive hubs for the
best talent from abroad, and will
be better able to connect with
new scientific hotspots.
ERA, the European Commission’s
long-running programme to
establish an integrated market for
research in the EU
7, provides the
framework for this European
policy agenda, but it should be
given a much greater sense of
urgency with a much stronger
focus on building excellence and
openness to researchers and
their institutions from outside the
EU. The intra-EU mobility agenda
should not be about navel gazing,
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